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Summary
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short take off and
landing, with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. The MV-22 is
the Marine Corps’ top aviation priority.  Marine Corps leaders believe that the
Osprey will provide them an unprecedented capability to quickly and decisively
project power from well over the horizon. The Air Force’s CV-22 version will be
used for special operations.  Army officials have testified that the service has no
requirement for the V-22, but the Navy has expressed interest in purchasing MV-22s
for a variety of missions.
The V-22 program has been under development for over 25 years.  Safety and
maintenance concerns have arisen during this period (due in large part to three fatal
accidents).  The commander of the V-22 maintenance squadron admitted to falsifying
maintenance records to make the aircraft appear more maintainable than it was, and
three Marines were found guilty of misconduct.  The program has maintained support
from many in Congress despite these deficiencies. The program has undergone
restructuring to accommodate congressional direction, budget constraints, and
recommendations from outside experts, and DOD managers.
After a 17 month hiatus, the Osprey embarked on its second set of flight tests
in May of 2002.  Tests were completed in June 2005 to the satisfaction of Navy
testers, who believe that the V-22 has resolved all technical and engineering
problems identified in internal and external reviews.  On September 28, 2005 the V-
22 program passed a major milestone when the Defense Acquisition Board approved
it for military use and full rate production.
Supporters tout the V-22’s potential operational capabilities relative to the
helicopters it will replace.  It will fly faster, farther and with more payload than the
CH-46 Sea Knight the Marine Corps currently operate.  They argue that this
combination of attributes, coupled with the ability to take off and land vertically will
provide the Marine Corps with new and potentially transformational capabilities.
Detractors tend to emphasize the V-22’s long development schedule, its three fatal
accidents, and its high cost relative to the helicopters it will replace.  V-22 opponents
argue that modern helicopters also offer capabilities superior to the CH-46’s and
more cost effectively than the Osprey.
Through FY2006, $20 billion had been provided for the V-22 program. The
Defense Department’s Selected Acquisition Report of December 31, 2005, estimated
the total acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5 billion, which
translates into a program acquisition cost of $110 million per Osprey.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Introduction
The V-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps’ top aviation priority.1  Marine Corps
leaders believe that the Osprey will provide them an unprecedented capability to
quickly and decisively project power from well over the horizon. In the words of one
former leader, its “...combination of increased payload with vastly improved speed
and range make the Osprey the aircraft that defines the commander’s area of
influence as it relates to placing Marines on the ground.”2 The aircraft’s promise,
however, has been dimmed by a series of challenges to its affordability, safety, and
program management.
The V-22 tilt-rotor design combines the helicopter’s operational flexibility of
vertical take off and landing with the greater speed, range, and fuel efficiency of a
turboprop aircraft. The V-22 Osprey takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter
but flies like a fixed-wing aircraft by tilting its wing-mounted rotors 90 degrees
forward to function as propellers. 
The V-22 is intended to perform a variety of Marine Corps and Air Force
missions, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious assault, search and
rescue, and special operations.  The Marines’ MV-22 version can transport 24
fully-equipped troops some 200 nautical miles (nm) at a speed of 250 knots (288
mph), exceeding the performance of the CH-46 medium-lift assault helicopters the
MV-22 will replace.  The Air Force’s CV-22 version (with a range of 500 nm) will
be used for special operations.  Army officials have testified that the service has no
requirement for the V-22.  The Navy has expressed interest in purchasing MV-22s
for a variety of missions, (e.g., personnel recovery, fleet logistic support, aerial
refueling, special warfare) but has no funds budgeted in the current Future Years
Defense Plan (FYDP).
Developed and produced by Bell Helicopter Textron of Fort Worth, TX, and
Boeing Helicopters of Philadelphia, PA, the aircraft is powered by two T406
turboshaft engines produced by Allison Engine Company of Indianapolis, IN, a
subsidiary of Rolls-Royce North America.  Fuselage assembly will be performed in
Philadelphia, PA.  Drive system rotors and composite assembly will be completed
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in Fort Worth, TX, and final assembly and delivery will be completed in Amarillo,
TX.
Through FY2006, $20 billion had been appropriated for the V-22 program. The
Defense Department’s Selected Acquisition Report of December 31, 2005, estimated
the total acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5  billion, which
translates into a program unit acquisition cost (PUAC) of $110 million per Osprey.
The PUAC includes funding for both development and production of the aircraft and
related activities.  The average procurement unit cost (APUC), which, for the Osprey
is estimated at $88.5 million does not include these sunk costs.
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) flight tests and Navy testers recommended that
DOD declare it operationally suitable, and effective for military use.  DOD’s Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation must also endorse the Osprey and the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) must review the program before full-rate production can
begin.
Background
The V-22 program has been under development for over 25 years.  Safety and
maintenance concerns have arisen during this period, but the program has maintained
support from many in Congress nonetheless. The program has undergone
restructuring to accommodate recommendations from outside experts and DOD
managers.
System Description
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short take off and landing,
with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft.  About 65% of the
airframe is made of graphite-epoxy composite materials.  The Marine Corps’s
MV-22 version will have the following characteristics:
Propulsion: 2 T406 turboshaft engines
Crew: 3
Passengers: 24 combat troops
Max. vertical take off weight: 47,500 lb
Max. short take off weight: 55,000 lb
Speed at max. weight: 250 knots/hour
Combat radius: 200+ nm
The airframes of the Marine Corps MV-22 and the Air Force CV-22 variant for
Special Operations Command will have some 90% commonality; the primary
differences being in avionics.  The CV-22 will carry 18 troops, with auxiliary fuel
tanks increasing combat radius to about 500 miles. This variant may carry  a 50-cal
GAU-19 nosegun for self defense.
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Figure 1.  V-22 Osprey in Flight
DOD plans to field V-22s in four blocks: Blocks B  and C for the Marine Corps,
and Blocks 10 and 20 for the Air Force.  Block B aircraft were produced first in
FY2004 and will be the aircraft with which the Marine Corps will achieve initial
operational capability (IOC).  Block B aircraft will improve upon those used in EMD
testing (Block A aircraft) with upgrades to avionics, communications, navigation.
It will also feature a retractable fuel probe, a ramp gun (for self defense), a joist, and
an improved position for the “fastrope” (a method for personnel to quickly exit the
aircraft while in hover).  The Air Force will achieve IOC with the Block 10 variant,
which will be based on the Block B, but feature advanced avionics, such as terrain-
following radar, and directed infrared countermeasures, that will allow special
operations forces to penetrate hostile areas in all weather and terrain. The Marine
Corps and Air Force plan to begin developing the most capable V-22 variants — the
Block C and Block 20 respectively — in FY2006, and begin producing them in
FY2009 and FY2012 respectively.  See the appendix for a complete list of V-22
features by Block.
Early Development
The V-22 is based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype which was developed by
Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977.  The Department of Defense began the V-22
program in 1981, first under Army leadership, but with the Navy/Marine Corps later
taking the lead in developing what was then known as the JVX (joint-service vertical
take-off/landing experimental aircraft).  Full-scale development of the V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft began in 1986.
Like some other tactical aviation programs (such as the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter), the total number of V-22 aircraft
planned for procurement has decreased over time. In 1989 the Defense Department
projected a 663-aircraft program with six prototypes and 657 production aircraft (552
MV-22s, 55 CV-22s, and 50 HV-22s).  As projected in 1994, however, the program
comprised 523 production aircraft (425 MV-22s, 50 CV-22s, and 48 HV-22s).
Procurement of these 523 aircraft was to continue into the 2020s, since the Defense
Acquisition Board limited annual expenditures for Marine MV-22s to $1 billion
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3 Former Secretary of Defense Cheney tried to terminate the program in 1989-92, but
Congress continued to provide funds for development of the V-22.  The George H. Bush
Administration’s FY1990 budget requested no funds for the program.  In submitting that
budget to Congress on April 25, 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the House Armed
Services Committee that he “could not justify spending the amount of money ... proposed
... when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very
narrow mission that I think can be performed ... by using helicopters instead of the V-22.”
(FY1994 dollars) when it approved entry into engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) in September 1994.  The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
released May 19, 1997, recommended accelerated procurement of 458 production
aircraft (360 MV-22s for the Marines; 50 Air Force CV-22s; and 48 Navy HV-22s).
Such a 458-aircraft program is now projected.
On March 19, 1989, the first of six MV-22 prototypes was flown in the
helicopter mode and on September 14, 1989, as a fixed-wing plane.  Two of these
aircraft were destroyed in crashes. Prototype aircraft numbers three and four
successfully completed the Osprey’s first Sea Trials on the USS Wasp (LHD-1) in
December 1990. The fifth prototype crashed on its first flight (June 11, 1991),
because of incorrect wiring in a flight-control system; the fourth prototype crashed
on July 20, 1992, while landing at Quantico Marine Corps Air Station, VA, killing
seven people and destroying the aircraft.  This accident was caused by a fire resulting
from hydraulic component failures and design problems in the engine nacelles.3
Flight tests were resumed in August 1993 after changes were incorporated in the
prototypes.  Flight testing of  four full-scale development V-22s began in early 1997
when the first pre-production V-22 was delivered to the Naval Air Warfare Test
Center in Patuxent River, MD.  The first EMD Flight took place on  February 5,
1997.  The first of four low-rate initial production aircraft,  ordered on April 28,
1997, was delivered on May 27, 1999. Osprey number 10 completed the program’s
second Sea Trials, this time from the USS Saipan (LHA-2) in January 1999.
Operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing of the MV-22 began in October 1999
and concluded in August 2000. On October 13, 2000, the Department of the Navy
announced that the MV-22 had been judged operationally effective and suitable for
land-based operations. On November 15, 2000, the Marine Corps announced that the
Osprey had successfully completed sea trials and had been deemed operationally
effective and suitable for both land- and sea-based operations.
Successfully completing OPEVAL should have cleared the way for full rate
production. This decision was to have been made in December 2000, but was
postponed indefinitely, due a mixed report from DOD’s director of operational test
and evaluation, and to two fatal accidents.
Accidents and Fatalities Worsen
On April 8, 2000, another Osprey crashed near Tucson, Arizona during an
exercise simulating a noncombatant evacuation operation. All four crew members
and 15 passengers died in the crash. An investigation of the accident  found that the
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4 V-22 JAGMAN Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps, Division of Public
Affairs, July 27, 2000, p.1.
5 Audit Report: V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft.  Report No.  D-2000-174.
Office of the Inspector General.  Department of Defense.  August 15, 2000.
6 James Dao, “Marines Ground Osprey Fleet After Crash Kills Four,” New York Times, Dec.
12, 2000.
pilot was descending in excess of the recommended flight envelope which may have
caused the aircraft to experience an environmental condition known as “power
settling” or “vortex ring state.” According to Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, the pilot was
descending more than a thousand feet per minute. The recommended descent rate is
800 feet per minute.” Following a two-month suspension of flight testing, the Osprey
recommenced OPEVAL in June 2000, with pilots flying a slightly tighter flight
envelope. A July 27, 2000 report by the Marine Corps Judge Advocate General
(JAG) (which had access to all non-privileged information from the safety
investigation) confirmed that a combination of “human factors” caused the crash. 
This mishap appears not to be the result of any design, material or maintenance
factor specific to tilt-rotors. Its primary cause, that of a MV-22 entering a Vortex
Ring State (Power Settling) and/or blade stall condition is not peculiar to tilt
rotors. The contributing factors to the mishap, a steep approach with a high rate
of descent and slow airspeed, poor aircrew coordination and diminished
situational awareness are also not particular to tilt rotors.4
A DOD Inspector General study concluded that the V-22 would not successfully
demonstrate  23 major operational effectiveness and suitability requirements prior to
the December 2000 OPEVAL Milestone III decision to enter full rate production in
June 20015. The Marine Corps agreed with DOD’s assessment of the deficiencies,
but said that they had been aware of these deficiencies before the beginning of
OPEVAL.  Furthermore, the Marine Corps said that they had an approved plan
designed to resolve the deficiencies prior to the Milestone III decision.
On November 17, 2000, DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
issued a mixed report on the Osprey; saying although “operationally effective” the
V-22 was not “operationally suitable, primarily because of reliability, maintainability,
availability, human factors and interoperability issues.” The report recommended that
more research should be conducted into the V-22’s susceptibility to the vortex ring
state blamed for the April 8, 2000 crash.
On December 11, 2000, a MV-22 Osprey crashed near Jacksonville, NC, killing
all four Marines on board. This was the fourth Osprey crash since 1991 and the third
lethal accident. The aircraft’s pilot,  Lt. Col. Keith M. Sweeney was the program’s
most experienced pilot and  was in line to command the first squadron of Ospreys.
The aircraft’s copilot, Maj. Michael Murphy was second only to Sweeney in flying
time on the Osprey.6  The Marine Corps  grounded the Osprey fleet pending a mishap
board investigation. On April 5, 2001, the Marine Corps reported that the crash was
caused by a burst hydraulic line in one of the Osprey’s two engine casings, and a
software malfunction that caused the aircraft to accelerate and decelerate
unpredictably and violently when the pilots tried to compensate for the hydraulic
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7 An un-redacted version of JAG investigation into the April 2000 V-22 crash indicates that
investigators found three “noteworthy” maintenance “areas of concern”, including the
Osprey’s hydraulics system. A Naval Safety Center presentation to the Blue Ribbon Panel
brought to light several previously unreported maintenance problems — including
hydraulics failures — that caused engine fires or other problems during the Osprey’s
operational testing. 
8  Mary Pat Flaherty, “Osprey Crash Blamed on Leak, Software,” Washington Post, Apr. 6,
2001.
9 Louise Story.  “Maker of Tubes for Osprey Aircraft is Indicted.” New York Times.  June
8, 2005.  Christopher J.  Castelli.  “Former Supplier of Hydraulic Tubing for V-22 Osprey
Faces Indictment.” Inside the Navy.  June 13, 2005.
10 This panel was chaired by retired Marine General John R. Dailey and included retired Air
Force General James B. Davis, Norman Augustine, and MIT professor Eugene Covert.
failure.7  The Marine Corps report called for a redesign of both the hydraulics and
software systems involved.8
Maintenance and Parts Falsifications
In December 2000, an anonymous letter was mailed to the media by someone
claiming to be a mechanic in the Osprey program.  The letter claimed that V-22
maintenance records had been falsified for two years, at the explicit direction of the
squadron commander.  Enclosed in the letter was an audio tape that the letter’s author
claimed was a surreptitious recording of the squadron commander directing
maintenance personnel to lie about the aircraft until the V-22 LRIP decision was
made.  On January 20, 2001, it was reported that the V-22 squadron commander
admitted to falsifying maintenance records.  The Marine Corps subsequently relieved
him of command and reassigned him to a different position.  At a May 1, 2001
hearing, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed their concern
that false data might impede DOD’s ability to accurately evaluate the V-22 program
and identify problem areas and potential improvements. The Department of
Defense’s Inspector General (IG) conducted an investigation.  On September 15,
2001, it was reported that three Marines were found guilty of misconduct and two
were reprimanded for their actions. 
In June 2005 a U.S. grand jury indicted a company that had supplied titanium
tubing for the V-22 program.  The indictment charged the company with falsely
certifying the quality of the tubes.  The V-22 test program was halted for 11 days in
2003 due to faulty tubes.  Replacing deficient tubes cost the V-22 program $4
million.  Navy officials do not believe that these deficient tubes caused fatal
mishaps.9
Reviews and Restructuring
On April 19, 2001, a Blue Ribbon panel formed by then-Secretary of Defense
William Cohen to review all aspects of the V-22 program, reported its findings and
recommendations.10  These findings and recommendations were also discussed
during congressional testimony on May 1, 2001.  The panel recommended that the
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11 Adam Hebert, “Minimal Sustainable Rate Will Dramatically Cut Near-Term V-22 Buys,”
Inside the Air Force, Apr. 20, 2001.
12 DOD News Briefing, Wed. June 27, 2001, 1:30PM and Kerry Gildea, “New V-22 Plan
Sustains Lower Tier Contractors, Jones Reports,” Defense Daily, May 15, 2001.
program continue, albeit in a restructured format.  The panel concluded that there
were numerous problems with the V-22 program — including safety, training and
reliability problems — but nothing inherently flawed in basic tilt-rotor technology.
Because of numerous safety, training, and reliability problems, the V-22 was not
maintainable, or ready for operational use.
The panel recommended cutting production to the “bare minimum” while an
array of tests were carried out to fix a long list of problems they identified  with
hardware, software and performance.  Cutting near term production was hoped to free
up funds to pay for fixes and modifications. Once the changes had been made and the
aircraft was ready for operational use, the Panel suggested that V-22 out year
purchases could be made in large lots using multi year contracts to lower acquisition
costs. Program officials estimated that the minimal sustainable production rate is 12
aircraft per year, which would be less than half the Ospreys once planned for
FY2002.11  In P.L.107-107 Sec.123, Congressional authorizers codified the Blue
Ribbon Panel’s recommendation to produce V-22’s at the minimum sustainable rate
until the Secretary of Defense can certify that the Osprey is safe, reliable,
maintainable, and operationally effective. 
DOD appears to have taken managerial and budgetary steps to incorporate the
Blue Ribbon Panel’s recommendations.  For example, DOD’s FY2001 supplemental
funding request asked for a reduction of $475 million in procurement and an increase
of $80 million in R&D funds.  The additional R&D funding was to be used to
support initial redesign and testing efforts to address deficiencies, logistics, flight
test, and flight test support for V-22 aircraft. The reduction in procurement funding
reflected the need to reduce production to the minimum rate while the aircraft design
changes are being developed and tested.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s FY2002 budget amendment, unveiled June 27,
2001, included a request for the procurement of 12 Ospreys. DOD comptroller Dov
Zakheim and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Jones both stated that the
procurement of  12 aircraft  in FY2002 would allow them to sustain the V-22
subcontractor base while simultaneously addressing the Osprey program’s needs.12
V-22s were procured at a rate of 11 per year from  FY2002 to FY2006.
Following the Blue Ribbon panel’s recommendations, former DOD
Undersecretary for Acquisition Edward “Pete” Aldridge assumed acquisition
authority for the V-22 program. Undersecretary Aldridge changed the V-22
program’s status from an ACAT 1C program — which gives the Department of the
Navy the highest required authority for production decisions — to an ACAT 1D
program.  Under the latter category, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) will
decide if and when the program is ready to enter full rate production. Other ACAT
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13 “Navy Loses Osprey Authority,” Washington Post, May 22, 2001 and Hunter Keeter,
“Aldridge Maneuvers V-22 Acquisition Authority Away from Navy,” Defense Daily, May
22, 2001 and Linda de France, “V-22 Osprey Production Authority Transferred from Navy
to DoD,” Aerospace  Daily, May 22, 2001.
14 Christopher Castelli, “ NASA Review Panel Endorses Resumption of V-22 Flight Tests,”
InsideDefense.com,. Nov. 14, 2001.
15 “Text: Aldridge Memo on V-22,” Inside the Navy, Jan. 7, 2002.
16 Tony Capaccio, “Textron-Boeing V-22 Needs Two years of Testing, Aldridge Says,”
Bloomberg.com, Oct. 16, 2001.
17 Thomas Ricks, “V-22 Osprey to Face Make or Break Tests,” Washington Post, Dec. 25,
2002, p.14.
1D programs, for example, include the F-22 Raptor and the now-cancelled RAH-66
Comanche helicopter.13 
A NASA-led review of the V-22 program, released November 6, 2001,
concluded that there were no known aero-mechanical phenomena that would stop the
tilt rotor aircraft’s development and deployment. The study focused on several aero-
mechanics issues, including Vortex Ring State, power problems, auto-rotation, and
hover performance.14
In a December 21, 2001 memo to the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy,
and the Commander, Special Operations Command, Undersecretary of Defense
Aldridge gave his authorization for the V-22 to resume flight testing in the April
2002 time frame. Secretary Aldridge expressed support for range, speed, and
survivability goals of the V-22. He noted, however that the program still had
numerous technical challenges to overcome, and emphasized that the V-22 must
demonstrate that “1) it can meet the needs of the warfighter better than any other
alternative, 2) it can be made to be reliable, safe, and operationally suitable, and 3)
it is worth its costs in contributing to the combat capability of U.S. forces.” Secretary
Aldridge approved the flight test program under the condition that the production rate
be slowed to the minimum sustaining level, that it be comprehensive and rigorous,
and that the restructured program is fully funded in accordance with current
estimates.15 Undersecretary Aldridge estimated that the V-22 would require at least
two years of flight testing before DOD could conclude that the aircraft is safe,
effective, and “worth the cost.”16 
Mechanical adjustments slowed the V-22 test schedule, and the MV-22 took its
first test flight on May 29, 2002. The Air Force CV-22 resumed flight tests on
September 11, 2002. Flight tests were designed to explore both technical and
operational concerns. Technical concerns include flight control software and the
reliability and robustness of hydraulic lines. Operational concerns explored included
whether the Osprey is too prone to Vortex Ring State to make it a safe or effective
aircraft, whether this potential problem is further exacerbated by multiple Osprey’s
flying in formation, and how well the V-22 handles at sea.17 
The principal differences between the aircraft that were grounded in 2000 and
the aircraft that began testing 17 months later (called “Block A” aircraft) are re-
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18 Jefferson Morris, “Pilot: Resumption of V-22 Testing To Be Treated Like First Flight,”
Aerospace Daily, Apr. 29, 2002.
19 Christopher Castelli. “Navy Convenes Mishap Board to Investigate Latest V-22 Incident.”
Inside the Navy. July 5, 2004.
20 Christian Lowe. “V-22 Ospreys Require New Engine Component Every 100 Hours.” Navy
Times. July 16, 2004.
21 Joseph Neff, “Eased Standards ‘Fix’ Osprey,” Raleigh News & Observer, May 19, 2002,
p.1.
22 “Aldridge Makes Progress Check on MV-22 at NAS Patuxent River,” Defense Daily, Feb.
11, 2003.
23 Tony Capaccio, “Boeing-Textron B-22 Gets Favorable Review From Pentagon Tester,”
Bloomberg.com, May 19, 2003.
routed hydraulic lines, and an improved caution and warning system.18  Technical
glitches were experienced during tests. Hydraulic failures, for example, continued
during the reinstated flight test program, once on August 4, 2003, (due to a mis-
installed clamp) and again on September 5, 2003. In June 2004 a V-22 was forced
twice to make an emergency landing.  During one landing, the aircraft  suffered a
“Class B” mishap (one causing between $200,000 and $1 million in damage).19  An
investigation revealed that the V-22 suffered from widespread problems with an
engine component that required replacement every 100 flight hours.20  
In conjunction with resuming flight testing, the Navy Department modified
certain V-22 requirements. For instance, the V-22 is no longer required to land in
helicopter mode without power (also known as “autorotation”), protection from
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been eliminated. The V-22 is no longer
required to have an “air combat maneuvering” capability; instead it must demonstrate
“defensive maneuvering.” Also, the requirement that troops be able to use a rope or
rope ladder to exit the cabin at low altitudes has been eliminated.21 Also concurrent
with the resumption of V-22 flight testing, DOD began an in-depth study of
alternatives to pursue in case the aircraft does not pass muster. Options reportedly
include purchasing the S-92, or upgrading CH-53, or EH101 helicopters.22 
After one calendar year and 466 hours of flight testing, DOD reviewed the
Osprey’s progress. On May 15, 2003, Thomas Christie, DOD’s Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) graded Bell-Boeing’s improvements to
the Osprey’s hydraulics as “reasonable and appropriate” and “effective.”23 Christie
also at that time  approved of the testing that had been completed and was satisfied
with what had been learned about the V-22’s susceptibility to Vortex Ring State. On
May 20, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board also reviewed the program and
approved of the flight test program’s progress.
Marine Corps officials recommended increasing the production rate in FY2006
from the minimum sustainable rate of 11 to 20 aircraft. However, in a August 8,
2003, memorandum, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Michael Wynne
announced that this acceleration “presents more risk than I am willing to accept.”
Instead, Wynne restructured the planned procurement, reducing the FY2006 purchase
to 11 aircraft.  “For subsequent years’ procurement planning, production rates should
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and Evaluation Force.  Department of the Navy.  February 18, 2005.
25 Andy Pasztor.  “Pentagon Clears Full Production for Osprey Aircraft.” Wall Street
Journal.  September 29, 2005.
increase by about 50% per year for a total of 152 aircraft through FY09,” according
to the August 8th memo. Wynne directed that the savings resulting from the reduced
procurement (estimated at $231 million) be invested in improving the V-22’s
interoperability, by funding the Joint Tactical Radio System, Link 16 and Variable
Message Format communication.  Wynne also directed that a multi-year procurement
(MYP) of the V-22 be accelerated.  While some suggest that this restructuring will
more quickly deliver high-quality aircraft to the Marines and Special Operations
Forces, others fear that slowing procurement will inevitably raise the platform’s cost.
In December 2004 the V-22 budget and schedule were restructured again.
Program Budget Decision 753 (PBD-753) cut 22 aircraft from the V-22’s production
schedule and $1.3 billion from the budget between FY2006 and FY2009
Current Status
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) flight. The test program was marked by two
emergency landings, a Class B mishap, a small fire in an engine compartment, and
problems with the prop-rotor gear box.  However, Navy testers recommended that
DOD declare the V-22 operationally suitable, and effective for military use.  This
recommendation was based, in part, on observations that the MV-22 had  complied
with the objectives of P.L.107-107 Sec.123: hydraulic components and flight control
software performed satisfactorily, the aircraft was reliable and maintainable, the MV-
22 operated effectively when employed with other aircraft, and the aircraft’s
downwash did not inhibit ground operations.24
On September 28, 2005 the V-22 program passed a major milestone when the
Defense Acquisition Board approved it for military use and full rate production.25
The  MV-22 continues testing to assess survivability and to develop tactics.  The CV-
22 is in developmental test and evaluation.  The program continues to experience
technical and operational challenges, and mishaps.  For example, an inadvertent
takeoff in March 2006 caused wing and engine damage in excess of $1 million.  An
engine component has been replaced because its failure in flight has caused seven
unexpected flight terminations.  In October 2005 a V-22 experienced engine damage
during flight due to icing.  An engine compressor failure during the V-22’s first
overseas deployment (July 2006) forced the aircraft to make a precautionary landing
before reaching its destination.
MV-22 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is anticipated for May 2007.  The
May 2005 flight test schedule for CV-22 has been extended by more than a year.
Developmental testing is scheduled to be completed in September 2007 and
OPEVAL in November 2007.  The Department of the Navy would like to negotiate
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a multiyear procurement (MYP) IOC is anticipated in February 2009. DoD
anticipates the following procurement V-22 procurement schedule:
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
MV-22 14 19 31 35 37 37
CV-22 2 5 6 5 5 5
Total 16 24 37 40 42 42
Key Issues
Should the Defense Department Procure the V-22 Aircraft?
Main Arguments of Those Who Say “Yes”. The Defense Department
should accelerate procurement of the V-22, which the Marine Corps considers its
most important aviation program, in order to obtain these aircraft sooner and at more
economical production rates.  The V-22 is needed to replace aging military
helicopters in all the services, which are costly to maintain and operate safely and
effectively.  The Army should reconsider its decision not to buy the V-22, which the
Air Force wants to procure for its Special Operations missions and combat search
and rescue.  The Osprey represents a truly joint capability, as evidenced by the
Navy’s desire to purchase MV-22s for search and rescue, and other missions. 
This tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the operational flexibility of a helicopter
without the helicopter’s inherent limitations of speed, range, and altitude.  While
there may be new helicopters that could replace and improve on today’s military
helicopters, V-22 proponents say that none of them would match the Osprey’s
capabilities.  When landing on hostile shores in a third-world conflict (typically
lacking important infrastructure such as airfields and roads), the V-22 would be
critical for the transport of Marines from ship to shore. Senior DOD officials have
testified that the V-22 would have, for example, made a significant contribution the
to war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Osprey has been rigorously tested and its accident rate is consistent with
other aircraft development programs, supporters say. While some technical problems
have been encountered, leading experts have testified that there are no technological
barriers to the employment of tilt-rotor technology. Engineering-level modifications
have, put the Osprey program back on track.  The recently complete OPEVAL
demonstrates that the V-22 program has resolved all of the concerns expressed by the
Blue Ribbon Panel and by Congress.
Supporters of the V-22 also cite the tilt-rotor’s potential value for civil aviation,
law enforcement, and foreign sales by the U.S. aerospace industry.26 The
development of tilt-rotor aircraft for the armed services could have significant
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spin-off effects for civil aviation and U.S. technology, giving the U.S. aerospace
industry a major competitive advantage in the international market.27
Main Arguments of Those Who Say “No”. The V-22 is unaffordable in
the present budgetary environment, when the cost of buying large numbers of these
transport/cargo aircraft would most likely be at the expense of more critical defense
needs.  Ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less expensive
helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which the Marines are likely to be
involved, where the V-22’s greater speed and range would not be needed.  Moreover,
Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would involve ship-to-shore
movement of troops and equipment, which would require coordination with aircraft
having less speed and range than the V-22.  Others have argued that the Osprey’s
hypothetical contribution to the war in Afghanistan is questionable due to the high
altitude of that country, and the Osprey’s inability to improve greatly over helicopter
performance in this area. 
Opponents cast doubt on the Osprey’s operational  capabilities and operational
concepts. A January 12, 2001 presentation by the GAO to the V-22 Blue Ribbon
Panel for instance said that the V-22’s cabin may  not be large enough to carry 24
combat-equipped Marines, and that the severe rotor down wash might impede the
ability of troops to exit the aircraft and move into combat positions. Also, to avoid
entering Vortex Ring State, Osprey’s will have to descend slowly, which will make
them vulnerable to ground fire in combat situations.  Critics also challenge
comparison’s that are made between the Osprey and conventional helicopters. The
Osprey can, they concede,  lift three times more dead weight than can the CH-46. But
the Osprey is also three times heavier and five times more expensive than the Sea
Knight.  Also, the CH-46 is a 1970s-era helicopter.  Critics argue that the V-22’s
performance should be compared to contemporary aircraft (such as the EH-101), not
one that is 30 year’s old.  When compared to contemporary helicopters, critics argue,
the V-22’s capabilities don’t appear nearly as impressive.28
In light of several V-22 crashes, three involving fatalities, many argue that the
tilt-rotor technology is not sufficiently mature to merit the Osprey’s production and
fielding. Studies suggest that tilt-rotor aircraft are more susceptible to airflow
instabilities that can cause Vortex Ring State than are traditional helicopters.29 And
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our understanding of the kinds of airflow anomalies that have caused numerous
deaths in V-22 flight testing are still very immature. Whatever commercial value a
tilt-rotor aircraft might some day have for civil aviation, the V-22’s value as a
military system is insufficient to justify its high cost ($110 million per aircraft) in
these times of budgetary constraints and higher priority defense needs.  Finally,
critics also argue that the Navy is “dumbing down” the V-22’s requirements and
making it a less effective aircraft. 
Congressional Action
Throughout the program, supporters have called for accelerating procurement
beyond the levels projected in the Administration’s plan, arguing that this would
reduce program costs over the long term and would get more aircraft in service
sooner.  In a potentially contrary development, on December 23, 2004, an internal
DOD Program Budget Decision (PBD 753) was leaked to the press. PBD 753
recommended cutting 22 aircraft from the V-22 production plan between FY2006
and FY2009. 
The administration’s FY2007 request included $2.2 billion in procurement and
RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as congressional action, is
summarized in Table 1, below.








































Matched requests Matched requests
The administration’s FY2006 request included $1.8 billion in procurement and
RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as congressional action, is
summarized in Table 2, below.






























Matched request + 2 RDT&E Matched request
Appropriations, House
H.R. 2863 (109-119)















Appendix: V-22 Block Configurations





















! Flight incident recorder





! Wheel well fire
suppression
! Oil cooler inlet screen
! Main Landing Gear
brake redesign
! Mid wing gear box
indicator
! Slip ring





! Multi mode radar
! “Silent Shield”
! Flight engineer’s data
display
! Flight engineer’s seat
! Low probability of
intercept/detection
radar altimeter








! Dual digital map








! CV-22 Heads up
Display (HUD)






! JTRS cluster 1 with
Link 16
! Emergency power
! Fuel dump corrections
